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(1) Introduction
As noted by the OECD, " [c] o-operation between tax administrations is critical in the fight against tax evasion and protecting the integrity of tax systems. A key aspect of that cooperation is exchange of information." 1 The OECD has a long history of working with exchange of information, particularly through bilateral tax treaties, but also through the multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance and, more recently, in the context of the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information. 2 Up until very recently, the main platform and the legal basis through which there could be exchange of information was Article 26 of the OECD Model.
3 Pursuant to this provision, exchange of information will take place when it is foreseeably relevant for the correct application of the tax treaty or to carry out the administration or enforcement of the domestic laws concerning taxes of every kind and description imposed on behalf of the Contracting States. 4 The condition of "foreseeable relevance" of the information exchanged was introduced in 2005, replacing the term "necessary" of the OECD Model Convention 1977. Information was considered to be "necessary" when it was relevant to correctly carry out the provisions of a tax treaty or to implement domestic taxes in the contracting State requesting the information.
In its final version, Article 26 of the OECD Model and its Commentary were amended by the OECD Council in 2012 and this amended version was incorporated in the 2014 OECD Model Tax Convention. An important change was the introduction of the opportunity for the competent authorities to use the received information for other purposes than for the assessment or collection of taxes. 5 Furthermore, the OECD Commentary now provides for three forms of exchange -on request, automatic and spontaneous -which may also be 1 http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-information/automaticexchange.htm 2 The Global Forum covers not only the 34 official member countries of the OECD but also other jurisdictions including offshore financial centres and emerging countries. The Global Forum had 126 members as of July 2015, including Singapore. 3 See also the OECD's Manual on Information Exchange, which provides practical assistance to officials dealing with exchange of information for tax purposes and may also be useful in designing or revising national manuals. It has been developed with the input of both member and non-member countries. The Manual follows a modular approach. See OECD, Manual on the Implementation of Exchange of Information Provisions for Tax Purposes: Approved by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 23 January 2006, available on: http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-information/36647823.pdf 4 Article 26(1) OECD Model 5 See para 2 of Article 26 OECD Model would help with automatic exchange of information and speed up the process, especially if a large number of countries participate in a standardising exercise. 16 Notwithstanding references to automatic or spontaneous exchange of information in these various models, it should be emphasised that until relatively recently, exchange of information was to an extent mainly on request and rather sporadic. Exchange of information in general as an instrument for fighting international tax avoidance and tax havens got a major boost following the G20 Communiqué issued at the London 2009 Summit. In this summit, the G20 leaders agreed to take action against non-cooperative jurisdictions, including tax havens, and if necessary to deploy sanctions to protect their public finances and financial systems. 17 The era of banking secrecy was declared to be over and countries were called to adopt and implement the international tax standards of transparency and information exchange -standards which had become top priority by then. This message was reinforced at the G8 meeting in July 2009 and subsequent G8 and G20 meetings, though no sanctions have yet to be taken.
Since 2009, the OECD has been publishing progress reports on the implementation of the internationally agreed tax standard 18 by jurisdictions surveyed by the Global Forum. In these progress reports, jurisdictions are categorised in three lists: the white list, 19 the grey list 20 and the black list. 21 In the April 2009 progress report, there were four jurisdictions on the black list 22 and numerous jurisdictions on the grey list. This list has been regularly updated and there are now no countries on the black list. All jurisdictions covered by the Global Forum have now committed to the international agreed tax standards and more than half have implemented them. Furthermore, a peer review process has begun to monitor jurisdictions, to assess their legal and regulatory framework, the actual implementation of standards and their tax treaties and tax information exchange agreements. To an extent, until the recent peerreview work by the Global Forum had commenced, the scope of exchange of information as proposed by Article 26 of the OECD Model was often limited in bilateral conventions, because of domestic constraints -it was often not included or if included not applied. 23 With exchange of information taking a central stage in the fight against tax avoidance and tax evasion, several international initiatives and developments have led to large-scale automatic exchange of information to become the norm rather than the exception. What will be shown in this paper is that, even though automatic exchange of information was before considered to be inconceivable, lately, intense international political interest has led to the advent of global standards for automatic exchange of information. In fact, in June 2015, at the G7 Summit held at Bayern in Germany, the G7 leaders reiterated their commitment to promoting the exchange of information on an automatic basis and urged other jurisdictions to implement the international standards for exchange of information expeditiously. 24 These developments are explored in this paper, after a brief analysis of the concept of automatic exchange of information. The author has reviewed materials available up to 1 December 2015.
(2) Automatic Exchange of Information
International automatic exchange of tax information generally involves the systematic and periodic transmission of a large amount of tax-relevant information regarding non-resident taxpayers by the tax administration of the source country to the residence country. The tax relevant information usually concerns various categories of income (e.g. dividends, interest, etc.). 25 It is thought that the information transmitted can provide timely information on noncompliance where tax has been evaded either on an investment return or on the underlying capital sum, even where tax administrations have had no previous indications of noncompliance.
Tax information, which is exchanged automatically, is normally collected in the source state on a routine basis, generally, through reporting by third parties; usually, financial institutions, that make or administer payments to non-residents. Automatic exchange of information enables the tax authority of a taxpayer's country of residence to check its tax records to verify that taxpayers have accurately reported their foreign source income. In addition, information concerning the acquisition of significant assets may be used to evaluate the net worth of an individual and to verify if the reported income reasonably supports the transaction.
The OECD report on automatic exchange of tax information divides this process of automatic exchange of information into the following seven steps: 26 "1. Payer or paying agent collects information from the taxpayer and/or generates information itself. 2. Payer or paying agent reports information to the tax authorities. 3. Tax authorities consolidate information by country of residence. 4. Information is encrypted and bundles are sent to residence country tax authorities. 5. Information is received and decrypted. 6. Residence country feeds relevant information into an automatic or manual matching process.
7. Residence country analyses the results and takes compliance action as appropriate." 27 The information to be exchanged automatically typically includes the name of the taxpayer, the tax identification number (TIN) assigned by the residence state, the taxpayer's temporary and permanent addresses, the type and amount of the income earned, and the details of the payer in the source state. It can also cover other matters, such as information on financial assets, immovable property and VAT refunds. 28 Automatic exchange of information typically serves the residence state in determining the tax liability of its residents when that liability depends on the worldwide income or assets of the resident. It also helps to determine the accuracy of the income declaration of a resident taxpayer or the accuracy of the claims or proof asserted by the resident taxpayer in substantiating a tax declaration.
Automatic exchange is thought to be very beneficial as a tool to counter offshore noncompliance. It can provide timely information on non-compliance where tax has been evaded either on an investment return or the underlying capital sum. It can help detect cases of noncompliance even where tax administrations had no previous indications. Other benefits include its deterrent effects, increasing voluntary compliance and encouraging taxpayers to report all relevant tax information regarding foreign-source income to their residence states.
Overall, automatic exchange of tax information ensures the equal treatment of the domestic and foreign-source incomes of resident taxpayers, thereby eliminating the opportunity for the tax-distorted reallocation of economic and financial resources. To an extent, it also helps to educate taxpayers in their reporting obligations, increase tax revenues and lead to fairnessensuring that all taxpayers pay their fair share of tax in the right place at the right time. 29 The idea of automatic exchange of information on a wide scale and on a mandatory basis was introduced for the first time, albeit in limited circumstances, through the Savings Directive.
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This is examined next.
(3) Automatic exchange of information in the European Union (a) The Savings Directive
The Savings Directive initiated automatic exchange of information as the standard for exchange of information relating to interest payments made to non-resident beneficiaries in the EU. The Savings Directive was part of the tax package intended to counter harmful tax competition. The Directive was adopted on 3 June 2003, but only became effective on 1 July 27 Although the instrument has now been repealed, it is useful to consider its provision and the balance achieved therein. Broadly, the Savings Directive was based on exchange of information and in the absence of that, the imposition of withholding taxes. All the Member States (through their competent authorities) 34 were ultimately expected to exchange information automatically on interest payments made by paying agents 35 to beneficial owners 36 who were individuals resident in another Member State. 37 If the recipient acted as a paying agent, or on behalf of a legal person, or on behalf of another individual who was the beneficial owner, the recipient was not the beneficial owner for the purposes of the Savings Directive. 38 The beneficial ownership concept was tailored to the demands of the Savings Directive.
For a transitional period, 39 Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg were able to impose withholding tax in lieu of exchanging information. This withholding tax was set at 15% for the first three years (i.e. since 2005), 20% for the following three years and 35% thereafter. 32 See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/11/10-savings-taxation-directive-repealed/ 33 See Council Directive 2014/107/EU on administrative cooperation in the field of direct taxation which provides for automatic exchange of financial account information between Member States. See below, Part 3(b) of this paper. 34 Competent authorities were defined in Article 5 of the Savings Directive. For the Member States, it was any of 'the authorities notified by the Member States to the Commission' (Article 5(a)). For third countries, it was 'the competent authority for the purposes of bilateral or multilateral tax conventions or, failing that, such other authority as is competent to issue certificates of residence for tax purposes' (Article 5(b)). 35 A paying agent 'means any economic operator who pays interest to or secures the payment of interest for the immediate benefit of the beneficial owner'. Ibid, Article 4(1). The Savings Directive also extended the definition of paying agent to any Member State entity receiving interest for the benefit of the beneficial owner, excluding legal persons, certain collective investment vehicles and some other entities. Ibid, Article 4(2) 36 Beneficial owner meant 'any individual who receives an interest payment or any individual for whom an interest payment is secured, unless he provides evidence that it was not received or secured for his own benefit'. Savings Directive, Article 2(1) 37 Under Article 9 of the Savings Directive, the competent authority of the Member State of the paying agent had to communicate information to the competent authority of the Member State of residence of the beneficial owner. This communication of information was automatic and had to occur at least once a year. 38 If the paying agent had indications that the recipient was not the beneficial owner, it had to take reasonable steps to identify the true beneficial owner. If unable to do so, it had to consider the recipient as the beneficial owner. Savings Directive, Article 2(2). 39 The transitional period would end if and when the European Union entered into an agreement with Switzerland, and Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino to exchange information on request as defined in the OECD Model Agreement on Exchange of Information on Tax Matters 2002 in relation to interest payments, and if and when the Council agreed by unanimity that the United States was committed to exchange of information in relation to interest payments on request as defined in the OECD Model Agreement mentioned. Savings Directive, Article 10. 40 Ibid, Article 11 There were revenue sharing provisions for the tax withheld, i.e. 25% of the tax was retained in the source Member State and 75% was transferred (anonymously) to the Member State of residence of the beneficial owner of the interest. 41 Since 1 January 2010, Belgium discontinued applying the transitional withholding tax and joined the other Member States in adopting the exchange of information regime. Luxembourg also stopped applying the transitional withholding tax as of 1 January 2015. Austria was to start exchanging information by September 2017 on a limited set of accounts.
A beneficial owner could authorize the paying agent in one of the derogating Member States to report information so as to avoid the imposition of a withholding tax. The Savings Directive stated that the derogating Member States must have procedures in place for taxpayers who want to opt for information exchange rather than withholding taxes. The Directive provided for two procedures of exception from withholding tax: certification and voluntary disclosure. 42 The Savings Directive only applied to interest paid by a paying agent established in a Member State to an individual beneficial owner in another Member State. Accordingly, there was wide scope for avoidance if the payment was routed from a non-EU paying agent to an EU-resident individual. That is why it was important for the same or equivalent measures, i.e. the exchange of information or withholding tax, to also apply, from1 July 2005, in five European countries (Switzerland, and Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino) and in 10 dependent or associated territories of the Member States (Anguilla, Aruba, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Guernsey, the Isle of Man, Jersey, Montserrat, the Netherlands Antilles, and the Turks and Caicos Islands).
Under the Savings Directive, it was also easy to circumvent the provisions of the Directive, for example, by routing interest payments through a non-EU paying agent, which was not in the list of countries that had agreed to apply same or equivalent measures. Alternatively, an individual could interpose a company to receive the interest on his behalf. As a result, these situations would fall outside the scope of the Savings Directive.
As far as the first practice was concerned, in a subsequent review of the Savings Directive, 43 the Commission had proposed for some intermediary structures to act as 'paying agent upon receipt' for interest paid from any upstream economic operator, wherever established. Under the proposed rules, certain entities or legal arrangements listed in a proposed Annex to the Directive would be caught if they were not taxed on their income or on the part of their income arising to their non-resident participants, under the general tax rules of their Member State of establishment. 44 Only entities and arrangements that were listed in the relevant 41 Annex would be deemed to be paying agents upon receipt. The list contained entities and arrangements from each Member State.
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As far as the second practice was concerned, there was a proposal for a selective lookthrough approach. Here, if the paying agent had obtained information in the performance of its anti-money laundering duties 46 that payment made to a legal person or arrangement was, in fact, for the ultimate benefit of an EU-resident individual beneficial owner, it had to look through this legal person or arrangement. 47 The proposed amendment did not apply the lookthrough approach to all legal entities. It only applied to specific legal persons and arrangements established in selected jurisdictions outside the European Union where appropriate taxation of interest income was not ensured. Again, there was an exhaustive list in the proposed Annex I.1. For Singapore, a trust would be a specific legal person for the purposes of this provision.
Certainly, the solution proposed was imperfect and strictly confined to entities and arrangements set out in the proposed Annexes. Therefore, not all intermediary structures would be covered, nor all entities looked through. Some would though, making the Savings Directive of relevance to persons other than individuals.
On 24 March, 2014 the EU Council of Ministers finally adopted the revised version of the Savings Directive 48 and changes were made to close existing loopholes and better prevent tax evasion. National rules transposing the revised Savings Directive were to be adopted by Member States by January 2016. 49 Ironically, just when the amendments to the Savings Directive were finally approved, it was recognised that the whole Directive would be repealed in the near future. for five types of income based on available information. 60 Income from employment, director's fees, life insurance products not covered by other Directives, pensions, ownership of and income from immovable property were subject to automatic exchange of information. This was in addition to exchange upon request and spontaneous exchange. 61 There was an indication that the list could be extended to other categories of income and capital and especially dividends, capital gains and royalties, following Commission report to be submitted on 1 January 2017.
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At the October ECOFIN 2014 meeting mentioned in Part 3(a), Member States agreed on a Commission proposal to apply the widest possible scope of automatic exchange of information within the European Union, to mirror the global standard of automatic information exchange agreed by the G20/OECD. 63 It was agreed that from 2017, Member State tax authorities would automatically exchange information with each other on most categories of income and capital held by private individuals and certain entities. Austria was to be given an additional year to apply the new rules, so as to have sufficient time to make the necessary technical adaptations.
Since its amendment on 9 December 2014, the Mutual Assistance Directive on Exchange of Information brings a list of financial information within the scope of the automatic exchange of information with effect from 1 January 2017. This information consists of interest, dividends and similar type of income, gross proceeds from the sale of financial assets and other income, and account balances. The revised Mutual Assistance Directive covers a wide scope of income and capital -including most of what was already covered by the revised Savings Directive -and matches all the financial information targeted by FATCA and the OECD's Common Reporting Standard, both of which are considered in this report. In order to have just one standard of automatic exchange and to avoid legislative overlaps, the Commission recommended the repeal of the Savings Directive to ensure that no loopholes are created or left for tax evaders -which eventually happened in November 2015.
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Attention ought to be paid on certain novel aspects of the amended Mutual Assistance Directive on Exchange of Information. For example, there is a requirement that the data subject is notified of the proposed exchange in sufficient time to exercise his data protection rights. 65 It is not clear how this will be applied in the context of bulk information to be exchanged automatically. Arguably, notice could be deemed to have been given by some form of publication of the applicable tax rules on the relevant financial products. However, this is not guaranteed and the requirement of notification, if not properly addressed, could trump the underlying reasons behind the amendments.
Another important aspect of the Mutual Assistance Directive 2011/16/EU which remains in place following the amendments brought by the 2014 ECOFIN meeting, is the most-favournation clause. Under Article 19 of the Directive, where a Member State provides a wider 60 See Article 8(1) which stipulated that the following would be subject to automatic exchange of information. Income from employment, director's fees, life insurance products not covered by other Directives, pensions, ownership of and income from immovable property. 61 Arts 5-7, 9 62 See Article 8(5) 63 See Part 5 below 64 See Part 3(a) above. 65 See Article 1(5)(b) which require each reporting financial institution to inform each individual reportable person that data will be collected and transferred, and to do so in sufficient time for the reportable person to exercise his data protection rights. cooperation to a third country than that provided for under the Directive, that Member State could not refuse to provide such wider cooperation to any other Member State wishing to enter into such mutual wider cooperation with that Member State. Also, under specific circumstances, information by a Member State from a third country may be transmitted to other Member States. 66 The combination of these clauses forced countries such as Luxembourg that entered into Intergovernmental Agreements with the US in the context of FATCA, 67 to provide financial information about capital, all income from capital and the balances of accounts to EU Member States. This was notwithstanding the fact that Luxembourg was not required to do so under the Savings Directive or Article 8 of the Mutual Assistance Directive. It is no surprise therefore that the exchange of information obligations under the Mutual Assistance Directive were subsequently officially amended to be aligned with FATCA and the OECD's Common Reporting Standard, without any disagreement by Member States. Most Member States would eventually be forced to exchange information at that level anyway, due to their FATCA-generated obligations.
The European Union is, however, going a step further in its initiatives on exchange of information. In the context of its Tax Transparency Package, in early 2015 the Commission published a proposal to further amend the Mutual Assistance Directive on Exchange of Information to include automatic exchange of tax rulings between Member States, on a quarterly basis. This proposal has recently been adopted and is reviewed below.
(c) Automatic Exchange of Tax Rulings -The Tax Transparency Package
On the 18 March, 2015, the Commission presented its Tax Transparency Package -the latest initiative of its ambitious agenda to tackle corporate tax avoidance and harmful tax competition in the EU. A key element was the proposal to introduce the automatic exchange of information between Member States on their tax rulings. The problem with tax rulings is that Member States shared very little information with one another about their tax rulings and it was at their discretion to decide whether a tax ruling might be relevant to another EU country. As a result, Member States were often unaware of cross-border tax rulings issued elsewhere in the EU which may impact their own tax bases. This lack of transparency was exploited by certain companies in order to artificially reduce their tax contributions.
As noted in the Commission Communication on tax transparency, 68 tax rulings which result in a low level of taxation in one Member State may entice companies to artificially shift profits to that jurisdiction. "Not only can this lead to serious tax base erosion for other Member States, but it can further incentivise aggressive tax planning and corporate tax avoidance." circumstances. 70 The Member State granting the tax ruling is, however, the only one to decide whether, and for whom, this information may be relevant. Moreover, it can refuse to spontaneously exchange information on the basis of its commercial secrecy laws or public policy. To address this situation, the Commission proposed new provisions on exchange of tax rulings to be built into the existing legislative framework for information exchange, through amendments to the Mutual Assistance Directive. 71 This would enable the rapid implementation of automatic exchange of information on tax rulings, as the procedures and processes to do so were already in place. This is not the first time that automatic exchange of tax rulings was considered within the European Union. During 2012, the Code of Conduct Group for Business Taxation had reviewed developments in Member States' procedures regarding tax rulings. The Group had identified the types of cross-border rulings on which information should be exchanged spontaneously and recommended the development of a Model Instruction that could be used by Member States for internal application. 72 Obviously, the scope of the Commission's proposal under the Tax Transparency Package is much more wide-ranging than this. Member States would be required to automatically exchange information on their tax rulings. Every three months, national tax authorities would have to send a short report to all other Member States on all cross-border tax rulings and advance pricing agreements 73 that they have issued after the date of entry into force of the suggested Directive, including those which were issued during the last 10 years but remain valid on 1 January 2016. Member States would then be able to ask for more detailed information on a particular ruling.
The exchange of information is expected to be carried out using a standard form that will be adopted by the Commission. The Commission will develop a database where information 70 For example, if the country has grounds for assuming that there may be loss of taxation in another Member State and this information would be foreseeably relevant for the enforcement of the income tax law of that other Member State, or if a person liable to tax obtains a reduction in, or an exemption from, tax in one Member State which would give rise to an increase in tax or to liability to tax in the other Member State, or if the competent authority of a Member State has grounds for supposing that a saving of tax may result from artificial transfers of profits within groups of enterprises etc. See Article 9(1) of existing Mutual Assistance Directive 2011/16/EU, which sets out the scope and conditions of spontaneous exchange of information. 71 The proposed Directive would also update the rules in the existing Directive concerning the provision of feedback, the practical arrangements for information exchange and the evaluation of administrative cooperation so as to extend them to the automatic information exchange on advance cross-border rulings and advance pricing arrangements. 72 See Document 10903/12 FISC 77, mentioned in the proposal, p.3 73 Under paragraph 5 of the proposed Article 8a of the Directive, (Scope and conditions of mandatory automatic exchange of information on advance cross-border rulings and advance pricing arrangements) the information to be communicated shall, as a minimum, include the following: (a) the identification of the taxpayer and where appropriate the group of companies to which it belongs; (b) the content of the advance cross-border ruling or advance pricing arrangement, including a description of the relevant business activities or transactions or series of transactions; (c) the description of the set of criteria used for the determination of the transfer pricing or transfer price itself in the case of an advance pricing arrangement; (d) the identification of the other Member States likely to be directly or indirectly concerned by the advance cross-border ruling or advance pricing arrangement; (e) the identification of any person, other than a natural person, in the other Member States likely to be directly or indirectly affected by the advance cross-border ruling or advance pricing arrangement may be recorded and centralised for other Member States to detect certain abusive tax practices by companies and take the necessary action in response. 74 After the initial exchange, a Member State may request more details or the full text of the document if it can demonstrate that the information is foreseeably relevant.
The concept of advance tax ruling and advance pricing agreement are broadly defined to ensure there are no divergent interpretations which could enable Member States to circumvent their obligations. 75 Tax rulings and advance pricing agreements that cover purely domestic transactions or cross-border rulings that exclusively concern the tax affairs of natural persons are outside the scope of the proposal. It should be noted that the cross-border element does not seem to be restricted to EU Member States. To an extent, whether or not a transaction is a cross-border one does not appear to be well-defined. 76 The Mutual Assistance Directive provides for a general limitation, according to which the provision of information may be refused by Member States where it would lead to the disclosure of a commercial, industrial or professional secret, or of a commercial process, or of information whose disclosure would be contrary to public policy. 77 Under the proposal, this limitation would not apply with respect to the exchange of information on advance tax rulings and advance pricing agreements. 78 The Commission considers that such interests would be adequately protected under EU law and that the limited nature of the information that is required to be shared with all Member States should ensure sufficient protection of those commercial interests.
In its Communication accompanying the proposals of the Tax Transparency Package, the Commission argued that this initiative would encourage healthier tax competition, as tax authorities would be less likely to offer selective tax treatment to companies if this was open to scrutiny by their peers. 79 The automatic exchange of information on tax rulings would enable Member States to detect certain abusive tax practices by companies and take the necessary action in response.
In the Communication, the Commission also repeated its proposal to repeal the Savings Directive, as this text had since been overtaken by more ambitious EU legislation, which required the widest scope of automatic information exchange on financial accounts, including savings related income. Repealing the Saving Directive would also create a streamlined framework in this context and prevent any legal uncertainty or extra administration for tax authorities and businesses.
The Commission outlined a number of other initiatives to advance the tax transparency agenda in the EU. New transparency requirements for multinationals would be assessed, such as the public disclosure of certain tax information by multinationals. The Commission would 74 See proposed paragraph 6 of proposed Article 8a which enables the possible creation by the Commission of a secure central directory concerning information communicated in the framework of this proposal. 75 See proposed paragraphs 14-15 of Article 3. 76 See amendment to Article 3 of the existing Directive -insertions of paras 14-15. Cross-border transaction is defined as follows: "[t]he cross-border transaction may involve, but is not restricted to, the making of investments, the provision of goods, services, finance or the use of tangible or intangible assets and does not have to directly involve the person receiving the advance cross-border ruling". 77 Article 17(4) 78 Article 8a(9). Also see preamble, paragraph 5. consider the benefits, costs and necessary safeguards in terms of data protection, protection of business secrets etc. It would also examine how it would affect international competitiveness. Impact assessment work would be launched to analyse the various possible options. The OECD's BEPS work on transparency requirements would also need to be considered, as well as the costs and benefits of transposing such rules into EU law. 80 Also, the Code of Conduct on Business Taxation was to be reviewed. It was noted that over the past years, the Code had become less effective in addressing harmful tax regimes as its criteria did not take into account more sophisticated corporate tax avoidance schemes. The Commission would therefore work with Member States to review the Code of Conduct as well as the mandate of the Code of Conduct Group in order to make it more effective in ensuring fair and transparent tax competition within the EU. 81 Further work would also be undertaken towards the better quantification of the tax gap. 82 The Commission, along with Eurostat, would work with Member States to see how a reliable estimate of the level of tax evasion and avoidance can be reached. The Commission would also continue to promote greater transparency internationally, furthering the OECD's efforts through its BEPS project.
As a follow-up, legislative proposals would be submitted to the European Parliament for consultation and to the Council for adoption. It was hoped that Member States would agree on the proposal for automatic exchange of tax rulings by the end of 2015, so that it can enter into force on 1 January 2016. On 6 October 2015, the Commission announced that Member States had reached an agreement on the automatic exchange of tax rulings, 83 with some amendments to the initial proposal. 84 The Commission's Tax Transparency package has been hailed as revolutionary by Commissioner for Taxation Pierre Moscovici, but also by the OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurria, who urged Member States to resist aggressive lobbying to weaken the legislation. 85 At a joint hearing by members of the Special Tax Rulings Committee and the 80 Ibid, p.5 81 Ibid, p.6 82 Ibid, p.6. It was explained that the tax gap is the difference between tax that is due and the amount actually collected by national authorities. Tax evasion and avoidance were not the only contributors to the tax gapadministrative errors and bankruptcies also played a role. 83 See Press Release on 6 October 2015, available on: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5780_en.htm 84 E.g. the initial proposal would have required EU Member States to automatically exchange information on cross-border tax rulings and APAs that were issued over the last 10 years, on a quarterly basis. The revised proposal reduces the retroactive period to five years. Advance cross-border rulings and APAs issued, amended or renewed after 31 December 2011 would now fall within the scope of new rules, provided that advance rulings or APAs are still valid on 1 January 2017. Rulings that are no longer valid on 1 January 2017 would also fall within the scope of new rules, provided they are issued, amended or renewed after 31 December 2013. Rulings and APAs concerning SMEs that meet a group-wide annual net turnover of a maximum of €40 million, do not have to be exchanged if issued, amended or renewed before 1 April 2016. The exemption does not apply to companies conducting mainly financial or investment activities. There is some protection of trade secrets. The information to be disclosed would include a summary of the ruling, including a description of the relevant business activities or transactions, but exclude the disclosure of a commercial, industrial or professional secret or of a commercial process, or of information whose disclosure would be contrary to public policy. The European has certainly been living up to its pledge of tackling tax evasion and aggressive tax planning. Whether the measures on enhanced transparency will improve Member States' capacity to address harmful tax practices and profit shifting beyond EU borders, without having a detrimental impact on the international competitiveness of EU companies remains to be seen.
(d) Rubik Agreements
The so-called Rubik Agreements are agreements aimed at resolving past liabilities from undeclared assets and to enforce a withholding tax for the future. Specifically, the Rubik Agreements provide for source taxes on interest of saving accounts without disclosing the taxpayer's name. Switzerland has entered into such agreements with other Member States.
88
Although Switzerland is not an EU Member State, Rubik Agreements are considered in the context of automatic exchange of information in the European Union.
Similar to the initial version of the Savings Directive, under Rubik Agreements, the withholding tax acts as a substitute for reporting and enables taxpayers not to declare their offshore income in their country of residence. A bank acts as a paying agent -it withholds a tax on the accounts, without revealing the identity of the owners. In return, the country of residence receives anonymously the tax revenues generated by the withholding tax. As such, banking secrecy is preserved. The tax only affects private individuals resident in the countries covered by the agreements. Certain items of income are not included under Rubik Agreements (i.e. wages, directors' fees, royalties etc). Therefore, there is a huge incentive to transform interests into these kinds of income so as not to suffer withholding tax or face disclosure. In general terms, these agreements take a contrary approach to the prioritization of exchange of information. However, the recent conclusion of the EU-Switzerland Tax Transparency Agreement 2015 which formally implements the OECD's Common Reporting Standard, combined with the formal commitment of the UK and Austria to move to automatic exchange of information suggests that the current withholding tax agreements that Switzerland maintains with Austria and the United Kingdom will eventually cease to apply.
More specifically, on 27 May 2015, the European Union and Switzerland signed an agreement on the automatic exchange of financial account information, aimed at improving international tax compliance. 92 Technically, the European Union and Switzerland signed a Protocol which amended their existing 2004 Savings agreement and transformed it into an agreement on automatic exchange of financial account information based on the OECD's global standard. 93 Under the revised agreement the European Union and Switzerland will automatically exchange information on the financial accounts of each other's residents, starting in 2018. The information to be exchanged relates not only to income such as interest and dividends, but also account balances and proceeds from the sale of financial assets.
The revised agreement represents a significant step forward for the European Union in its fight to combat tax fraud and tax evasion. agreements may be used in the future by countries with negotiating power which refuse to adopt standards of automatic exchange of information.
(4) FATCA
A more far-reaching initiative on exchange of information is the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), 94 which was enacted following the UBS offshore tax-evasion scandal and President Obama's campaign commitment to crack down on offshore tax evasion.
95 FATCA creates a new information reporting and withholding tax regime on financial accounts of US persons held in foreign financial institutions and other foreign entities. Congress enacted FATCA to make it more difficult for (resident and non-resident) US persons to hide financial assets which are not located in the US.
Under FATCA, foreign financial institutions (FFIs) such as banks, funds, certain brokers, trusts and trust companies must report information on financial accounts of US persons and foreign entities with significant US ownership directly to the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"). Reportable accounts are financial accounts maintained by the FFI where the account holder is either a specified US person (which includes any individual who is a citizen or resident of the United States) or is a non-US entity with controlling persons that include one or more specified US persons. Controlling persons are individuals who exercise control over an entity. FFIs must report the account balance or value of each US account and the amount of dividends, interest, other income, and gross proceeds from the sale of property credited to a US account. There are certain thresholds. For natural person, the foreign financial assets must exceed $50,000 to be reportable and for a legal person, they must exceed $250,000.
The objective of FATCA is the reporting of foreign financial assets; withholding is the cost of not reporting. Non-compliance with the FATCA legislation leads to a 30% withholding tax. This is imposed on specified payments from US sources and on the proceeds from disposing of certain US investments ("withholdable payments") on FFIs that do not comply with FATCA and have not become participating FFIs. The withholding tax applies to a wide range of payments from the United States to the non-participating FFIs, regardless of whether the payments benefit US persons, non-US customers of the institution, or the institution itself. FATCA also requires that participating FFIs impose a withholding tax on payments to nonparticipating FFIs in cases where the funding for those payments could be attributed to withholdable payments.
At the early stages of the enactment of this legislation, FATCA was widely criticised. This was because compliance with FATCA in the manner provided for in the legislation required FFIs in many jurisdictions to violate contractual relationships as well as data protection, bank secrecy, and other laws of the jurisdiction in which they are located. 96 Above all, the compliance and implementation costs for FFIs were also thought to be disproportionate, considering the rather limited projected benefits to the US fisc. 98 The Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation had estimated that FATCA would generate additional tax revenue of approximately $8.7 billion over the next ten years. 99 Industry sources believed that overall private sector implementation costs could equal or exceed the amount that was projected to be raised from FATCA. 100 Furthermore, the IRS costs associated with long-term development and implementation of the FATCA regime had not been systematically quantified. Following intense lobbying by many countries and financial institutions worldwide, in 2012, the US Treasury announced a new multilateral approach to implementing FATCA. The US Treasury and the finance ministries of five large European governments (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom) issued a joint statement announcing that they had reached an intergovernmental agreement for implementing FATCA. 102 In this joint statement, these countries committed to work together to achieve common reporting and due diligence standards for financial institutions in order to support a move to a more global system to combat offshore tax evasion. The intergovernmental approach adopted in the joint statement was based on reporting by financial institutions to the tax authority of the country in which they are located, followed by reciprocal automatic information exchange between governments. This intergovernmental approach would allow FFIs to rely on information they have already collected under anti-money laundering and "know your customer" rules to determine whether or not they have US taxpayers as clients and thus must collect and disclose information about them under FATCA. 104 The Models were refined and updated in 6 June 2014. 105 For US purposes, the Treasury Department has adopted the position that an IGA, like a Tax Information Exchange Agreement, is an executive agreement and not a treaty, and as such does not require the approval of the US Senate.
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There are two variations of the IGA Model 1. 107 Firstly, there is the reciprocal version (Model 1A) that provides for the United States to exchange information currently collected on accounts held in US financial institutions by residents of partner countries. Accordingly, the reciprocal version is available only to jurisdictions that have in effect an income tax treaty or tax information exchange agreement with the United States and with respect to governments which have in place robust protections and practices to ensure that the information remains confidential and that it is used solely for tax purposes. There is a policy commitment to pursue regulations and support legislation that would provide for equivalent levels of exchange by the United States.
There is also the non-reciprocal version (Model 1B), where no reciprocal exchange of information takes place. The non-reciprocal version is available in a format both for countries with and without a pre-existing income tax treaty or TIEA with the United States.
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Under both versions of the IGA Model 1, there is a framework for reporting certain financial account information by FFIs to their respective tax authorities, followed by automatic exchange of such information under existing bilateral tax treaties or TIEAs. Both versions of the IGA Model 1 include the "most favoured nation" clause with respect to other partner jurisdictions, 109 in that a partner jurisdiction is entitled to the benefit of any more favorable provision agreed to in a comparable IGA with another partner jurisdiction, subject to certain conditions.
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IGA Model 2 111 provides for direct reporting by an FFI to the IRS under its FFI Agreement or registration process, with group or aggregate reporting of recalcitrant account holders by the foreign government in response to a subsequent US request for exchange of information. Under this model, foreign governments only get involved when there is a request for exchange of information by the IRS. Under IGA Model 2, the IRS is able to make group requests to the foreign country based on the aggregate information reported to it by an FFI 105 More information about the IGA Models is available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/taxpolicy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx#ModelAgreementss 106 and based upon the standards in the relevant exchange of information treaty provision. 112 The foreign country then has six months to provide the information in the same format in which it would have been reported if the reporting FFI had reported it directly to the IRS. Under the IGA Model 2, the FATCA partner is again granted the "most favoured nation" status with respect to other partner jurisdictions. It should also be noted that Model 1 IGAs and Model 2 IGAs also contain a coordination provision, pursuant which a partner jurisdiction may permit its FFIs to use a definition in the relevant US Treasury Regulations in lieu of a corresponding definition in the IGA, provided that such application would not frustrate the purposes of the relevant IGA. 113 As noted above, the mainstream FATCA legislation includes the threat of a withholding tax as a punitive measure. However, this sanction is only triggered in IGAs in certain specified circumstances. Financial institutions in Model 1 IGA partner countries will be treated as compliant if they report information regarding US reportable accounts to their domestic authorities annually and register with the IRS website to get a Global Intermediary Identification Number (GIIN). As the information will be exchanged between the competent authorities under this Model, reporting FFIs in Model 1 IGA countries are not required to enter into an FFI Agreement with the IRS. In addition to registration requirements, FFIs are required to comply with other reporting requirements set out in the model. Non-compliance with the requirements does not immediately activate the withholding regime. An FFI is reclassified as a non-participating FFI when the competent US authority identifies cases of significant non-compliance and such cases are not remedied within 18 months.
Under Model 2 IGA, FFIs will be deemed compliant if they register with the IRS on the relevant website, obtain a GIIN and comply with their FFI Agreement, 114 which reporting FFIs in Model 2 IGA countries have to enter into (e.g. Switzerland and Japan). Again, if significant non-compliance is identified by the competent US authority, then the FFI will be reclassified as non-participating if it does not remedy the non-compliance within 12 months.
The information to be reported is in substance the same under both Models, though the procedure is different. The reciprocal character of Model 1A means that the competent authorities of the FATCA partner countries have much more responsibility that under Model 2. The competent authorities of FATCA partner countries subject to Model 2 IGA perform a supporting role in the exchange of information. 115 The implementation and administration costs are much higher under Model 1 than Model 2, as under Model 2 the costs are largely shifted to the financial institutions.
To an extent, the overall application of FATCA through the IGAs does not really ensure reciprocity by the US to its FATCA partner countries and may not be as effective to them. Even Model 1A IGA which is considered the reciprocal one provides only for partial reciprocity. Partner countries are committed to collect information on all income earned through financial accounts of US persons, gross proceeds received in those accounts and the balance of those accounts. In contrast, the obligation of the US government to report is limited to those types of accounts on which the United States has authority to collect 112 116 In fact, the limitations on reciprocity are acknowledged in the Model 1A IGA and the need for the US government to achieve equivalent levels of reciprocal automatic information exchange is raised. 117 It is stated that the US is committed to further improve transparency and enhance the information exchange relationship with the FATCA partner country "by pursuing the adoption of regulations and advocating and supporting relevant legislation to achieve such equivalent levels of reciprocal automatic exchange". 118 Overall, it has been argued that the decision to modulate some of the most coercive and extraterritorial parts of FATCA is consistent with the joint statement declaration that a collaborative approach would ensure that other countries and institutions join an automatic information exchange system.
119 Such a collaborative approach was more likely to achieve universal or near-universal compliance with FATCA than unilateral action. Moreover, the reporting and due diligence standards of Model 1 IGAs are widely viewed as being less commercially onerous than the original FATCA regulations.
Perhaps the ultimate contribution of IGAs is that they have not only served the purpose of eliminating the potential conflicts of laws issues of the initial FATCA legislation, but they have indirectly constituted an inspirational model for international cooperation in the automatic exchange of information. Certainly, the enactment of FATCA-generated obligations in general has accelerated and advanced progress towards the goal of efficient, automatic and global tax information exchange. FATCA and its by-products have undeniably been the catalyst for a general move towards automatic exchange of information as a norm, now encompassed in the OECD's Common Reporting Standard discussed below. 121 Furthermore, the UK agreed to automatically exchange information, on the basis of the intergovernmental approach with its Crown Dependencies and many of its Overseas Territories.
Most importantly, on 19 April 2013, the G20 Finance Ministers made an important endorsement of automatic exchange of information as the expected new standard and requested the OECD to develop the legal framework for this standard. This was the first time 116 Grinberg (2013) fn.96, p.334. He notes that in fact the income that the US will provide is more limited and there is no account balance reporting. 117 See Article 6(1) of Model Intergovernmental Agreement to Improve Tax Compliance and to Implement FATCA. This is the reciprocal Model 1A IGA. Available on: http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Documents/reciprocal.pdf 118 Ibid. 119 Itai (2013) that automatic exchange of information was accepted at such a high-level internationally and plans for its standardisation foreshadowed. To an extent, it was recognised that a proliferation of different and inconsistent models would impose significant compliance costs on both governments and financial institutions. Uniformity and simplification would translate to higher effectiveness and lower costs for all stakeholders concerned. Following this official endorsement, the OECD published a report entitled "A step change in tax transparency" which set out the concrete steps that needed to be undertaken to put a global model of automatic exchange in practice. 122 The report was welcomed by the G8 leaders on 19 June 2013.
On 6 September 2013, the G20 Leaders formally committed to automatic exchange of information as the new global standard and fully supported the OECD's work in this area. The standard would oblige countries and jurisdictions to obtain all financial information from their financial institutions and exchange that information automatically with other jurisdictions on an annual basis. The standard drew extensively on the intergovernmental approach to implementing FATCA, with a view to maximizing efficiency and reducing cost for financial institutions. On 23 February 2014, the G20 Finance Ministers endorsed the Common Reporting Standard 123 for automatic exchange of tax information.
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On 19 March 2014, there was a joint statement of an Early Adopters Group. 125 In this joint statement, more than 40 countries committed to early adoption of the Common Reporting Standard. 126 The Early Adopters Group committed to a specific and ambitious timetable leading to the first automatic information exchanges in 2017. The first exchange of information in relation to new accounts and pre-existing individual high value accounts would take place by the end of September 2017. 127 Information about pre-existing individual low value accounts and entity accounts would either first be exchanged by the end of September 2017 or September 2018 depending on when financial institutions identify them as reportable accounts. It was recognised that "only those financial centres which adopt the highest standards in tax transparency and work in close cooperation to tackle cross-border tax evasion will prosper in the future".
On 6 May 2014, the OECD Declaration on Automatic Exchange of Information in Tax Matters was endorsed by all 34 member countries along with several non-member countries. 129 The Declaration broadly affirmed the intention to adopt the OECD Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information (the Standard) "swiftly, on a reciprocal basis" 130 and called upon "all financial centers to implement the new single global standard without delay."
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In addition, the Declaration called on the OECD's Committee on Fiscal Affairs, working with G20 members, to "proceed rapidly with the elaboration of a) a detailed commentary to help ensure the consistent application of the new single global standard and b) the remaining technical modalities and safeguards including information and guidance on the necessary technical solutions, a standard format for reporting and exchange, and minimum standards on confidentiality". 132 The remaining elements of the work would be finalized and approved by mid-2014. The Declaration also recorded the need for assistance to be provided to developing countries so that they may be able to reap the benefits of this form of co-operation. 133 The Declaration committed countries to implement the new single global standard on automatic exchange of information. More than 60 countries and jurisdictions had committed to early adoption of the standard by then, and additional Global Forum members were expected to join this group in the coming months.
On 21 July 2014, the OECD released the full version of the Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information in Tax Matters. 134 The Standard was approved by the OECD Council on 15 July 2014.
The Standard provides for annual automatic exchange of financial account information between governments. It sets out the financial account information to be exchanged, the financial institutions that need to report, the different types of accounts and taxpayers covered, as well as common due diligence procedures to be followed by financial institutions. The financial information to be reported with respect to reportable accounts includes all types of investment income (including interest, dividends, income from certain insurance contracts and other similar types of income) but also account balances and sales proceeds from financial assets. The reportable accounts include accounts held by individuals and entities, which encompasses trusts and foundations. There is a requirement to look through passive entities to report on the individuals that ultimately control these entities.
The financial institutions that are required to report under the Standard include banks and custodians but also other financial institutions such as brokers, certain collective investment vehicles and certain insurance companies. 135 The range of financial institutions required to 129 Pre-existing financial accounts held by reportable entities will not be reported if the aggregate account balance or value does not exceed USD 250,000 as of December 31 of a reportable year. The account becomes reportable if the account balance exceeds USD 250,000 as of December 31 of any subsequent calendar year. New financial accounts held by reportable entities are to be reported irrespective of the account balance. There is no de minimis threshold as regards the reporting of pre-existing and new financial accounts held by individuals. 137 The Standard also describes the due diligence procedures that must be followed by financial institutions to identify reportable accounts. Reporting financial institutions are required to undertake due diligence procedures to identify financial accounts that have a non-resident account holder in a reportable jurisdiction. 138 The due diligence requirements vary depending on whether the account is held by an individual or entity. It also varies depending on whether the account is a pre-existing or a new account. It is more difficult and costly to collect information on pre-existing accounts. In addition, the due diligence procedures require financial institutions to look through certain entities (passive non-financial entities) to report on accounts that have a controlling person who is a non-resident. This is intended to limit the opportunities for taxpayers to circumvent reporting by using interposed legal entities.
The full version of the Standard includes commentaries and guidance for implementation by governments and financial institutions, detailed model agreements, as well as standards for harmonised technical and information technology modalities, notably a standard format and requirements for secure transmission of data. A country adopting the Standard must be or become a party to the Council of Europe/OECD Multilateral Convention on Mutual Assistance in Tax Matters which creates the legal framework for automatic exchange of information. It must also sign a Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement containing provisions of the Standard, to operationalise the automatic exchange of information.
Overall, the Standard provides a framework for governments regarding the financial account information to be collected by their financial institutions, and the different types of accounts and taxpayers covered, as well as common due diligence procedures to be followed by the financial institutions. The Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement specifies what information is to be exchanged and when. It contains detailed rules on confidentiality, safeguards and the existence of the necessary infrastructure for an effective exchange relationship. It also deals with practical issues, such as the timing and format of the exchange. 136 The most significant Non-Reporting Financial Institutions are: 1. governmental entities, international organisations or central banks; 2. broad or narrow participation retirement funds, or Qualified Credit Card Issuers; and 3. any other entities that present a low risk of being used to evade tax, have substantially similar characteristics to any of the entities described in paragraphs 1 and 2, and are defined in the implementing legislation as a NonReporting Financial Institutions, provided that the status as a Non-Reporting Financial Institution does not frustrate the purposes of the CRS. See Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information Report, Section VIII C17. 137 Ibid, Section I, para 11 138 Ibid, Sections II to VII The Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement essentially links the OECD's Standard and the legal basis for the exchange, allowing the financial account information to be exchanged.
The Standard will need to be translated into domestic law, whereas the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement can be executed within existing legal frameworks such as Article 6 of the Council of Europe/OECD Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters or the equivalent of Article 26 in a bilateral tax treaty. Before entering into a reciprocal agreement to exchange information automatically with another country, it is essential that the receiving country "has the legal framework and administrative capacity and processes in place to ensure the confidentiality of the information received and that such information is only used for the purposes specified in the instrument". 139 Overall, the Standard draws extensively on the earlier work of the OECD relating to automatic exchange of information, the US FATCA and the EU's Savings Directive reviewed in Parts 3 and 2(a) respectively. On 7 August 2015, the OECD published three new documents that provide guidance on the implementation of the global standard on automatic information exchange. These documents included an implementation handbook, 140 a Model Protocol to the Tax Information Exchange Agreements, 141 and an updated report on offshore voluntary disclosure programs. 142 The first edition of the handbook provides practical guidance to assist government officials and financial institutions in the implementation of the Standard. It sets out the steps needed for implementation; firstly, translating the reporting and due diligence rules into domestic law, secondly, choosing a legal basis to allow automatic information exchange, thirdly, setting up the necessary information technology, administrative infrastructure and resources and fourthly, protecting confidentiality and safeguarding data.
The handbook also contains a detailed section on the Standard and due diligence rules in chapter 4. There is also a chapter on the treatment of trusts in chapter 6, with guidelines, inter 139 Ibid, Section 1, Para 15
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The Implementation handbook is available on: http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-taxinformation/implementation-handbook-standard-for-automatic-exchange-of-financial-information-in-taxmatters.pdf . alia, on how to determine the status of a trust as either a financial institution or a nonfinancial entity for the purposes of automatic exchange of information.
The handbook aims to help financial institutions and governments implement the Standard more efficiently by promoting the consistent use of optional provisions and addressing the operational and transitional challenges resulting from the staggered implementation of the Standard. The handbook highlights the differences and similarities between the OECD's Standard and the FATCA intergovernmental agreements, identifying areas for alignment with FATCA which could enable governments to adopt a single approach for both reporting systems. The handbook also contains an annex with answers to frequently asked questions received from businesses and governments. Overall, the handbook is intended to be a "living" document and is expected to be updated on a regular basis.
The second OECD document released in August 2015, the Model Protocol to the Tax Information Exchange Agreements, provides the basis for jurisdictions wishing to extend the scope of their existing tax information exchange agreements to also cover the automatic and/or spontaneous exchange of tax information. As explained in Part 1 of this paper, the previous Model Agreement on Exchange of Information in Tax As regards the third OECD document released, the updated report on Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Programmes, this illustrated the OECD's substantial progress in the area of information exchange and transparency in tax matters. This second edition of the report contained a wealth of practical experience from 47 countries in relation to their voluntary disclosure programmes. The guidance on the design and implementation of such programmes was updated, particularly taking into account the views of private client advisers. This updated guidance was intended to encourage greater taxpayer compliance in the limited time before the OECD's Standard takes effect in many countries. This was the last window of opportunity for non-compliant taxpayers to voluntarily disclose. It was therefore a crucial moment to update the publication and reflected the OECD's policy of encouraging countries to examine voluntary compliance strategies that enable non-compliant taxpayers to come forward. The report outlined the principles for a successful voluntary disclosure program, 143 See Part 1 above. 144 See Model Protocol for the Purpose of Allowing the Automatic and Spontaneous Exchange of Information under a TIEA. Available on: http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/Model-Protocol-TIEA.pdf including clarity about the program's goals and terms, deterrents to non-compliance, and consistency with generally applicable compliance and enforcement regimes.
(6) The OECD's Standard for Automatic Information Exchange versus FATCA
To an extent the OECD's Standard is the direct outgrowth of FATCA and is in fact perceived as an enhanced version of FATCA. It is "an indication that the rest of the world has accepted FATCA and is ready to embrace its benefits, and inevitably also its burdens." 146 The network of IGAs was an intermediate step on the path to automatic exchange of information. Under both methods, the costs of the administration of the tax information exchanged are to an extent internalised by multinational FFIs. Having a global standard for automatic exchange of information could help emerging economies on the reporting on financial accounts and as a corollary the collection of taxes. It could create a minimum playing field for automatic exchange of information and create consistency in the exchange of information in an international level.
However, in many ways, the OECD's Standard will impose a heavier operational burden on financial institutions than FATCA. Although the due diligence requirements are modelled on those of the IGA, there are several differences between the two regimes, as FATCA is much narrower in scope. For example, FATCA only requires a financial institution to identify and report US customers, whilst the Standard requires financial institutions to report non-resident account holders of all countries participating in the Standard. The Standard does not provide the option of electing a de minimis threshold for individuals (FATCA has an account balance review threshold of US 50K), 147 therefore increasing the number of customers in scope for further due diligence and reporting. The Standard does not provide all of the exemptions available to low-risk financial institutions currently existing under FATCA, bringing more financial institutions under its scope. The Standard provides a number of definitions that differ either from FATCA or from the IGAs.
Furthermore, there are some conceptual differences between the two systems. The Standard is designed more like an expansion of existing anti-money laundering regimes. The aim is to identify the person moving the assets. FATCA is more about identifying the beneficial owner of accounts from a US tax perspective. In addition, there are no provisions for a withholding tax under the Standard, raising doubts as to its ultimate effectiveness.
In any case, overall, the scale of reporting with the Standard is likely to be much higher than with FATCA and so is the operational burden from the implementation and execution of the standard. Furthermore, the intergovernmental approach to FATCA reporting deviates in certain aspects from the Standard. The differences are driven essentially by the multilateral nature of the system envisaged under the Standard. There are also other US specific aspects, such as the concept of taxation on the basis of citizenship and the presence of a significant 148 Of course the US is unlikely to relinquish FATCA in favour of the OECD'S Standard any time soon, which means that in some cases there will be multiplication of the compliance burden on financial institutions. Nevertheless, the Standard at least reduces the risk that different countries would adopt different reporting standards unilaterally, which was a significant fear for financial institutions. Financial institutions would want to keep the momentum going and leverage what they have already done in preparation for FATCA to adapt to the OECD's global standard.
149 Once information exchange is fully operational under the IGAs and the Standard, a new era of international enforcement will have begun.
(7) Problems with Automatic Exchange of Information and the Various Standards
Certainly the principle of automatic exchange of information has had a big impact on systems and culture, especially in the financial services industry. Financial institutions today need to keep abreast of new reporting obligations around the world, manage relationships with multiple tax authorities, and educate staff and clients on reporting requirements and account opening procedures. 150 There is a major increase in reporting requirements with financial institutions (and other investment entities) having to collect sometimes complex information, which may vary in format and timing from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, with potential penalties for those unable or unwilling to comply fully.
NGOs have criticised the OECD's Standard because of its impact on developing countries.
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It has been argued that there should have been a period of non-reciprocity, where developing countries could simply receive financial data. Furthermore, there is concern that the OECD's Standard lacks provisions in favour of developing countries' engagement and as such shows "that having a global standard be designed by the OECD, a group of rich countries, rather than a much more representative and independent body such as the UN Tax Committee, entails the risks of having only the interests of developed countries included". 152 To ensure that developing countries are able to implement automatic exchange of information, several issues emerge, such as capacity building, multilateral engagement, non-reciprocity (if needed), proportional confidentiality requirements and sanctions or incentives to guarantee that secrecy jurisdictions will send information to developing countries and not just between themselves.
153 It has been argued that it is developed countries' moral obligation and in their best interests to establish low-entry barriers for developing countries to engage in automatic exchange of information. For example, some developing countries may need to benefit from receiving information before they are convinced -and able -to collect and send information themselves.
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On 22 September 2014, the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes delivered a Roadmap 155 to the G20 Development Working Group. This roadmap was aimed at facilitating developing country participation in the new OECD Standard on the automatic exchange of financial account information. This Roadmap was part of the efforts to curb multinational tax avoidance and offshore tax evasion in developing countries. As over half of the Global Forum's 121 member jurisdictions were developing countries, they stood to benefit from the Roadmap and its implementation.
Drawing on the Global Forum's extensive consultations with developing countries, the World Bank Group, other international organisations and civil society, the Roadmap provided a stepped approach to ensuring developing countries can overcome obstacles in implementing the new standard on exchange of information. The Global Forum's Roadmap identified the benefits, costs and the fundamental building blocks that developing countries need in order to meet the Standard.
Pilot projects with developing countries were suggested which would take a progressive approach to implementation, with a focus on meeting the particular needs of each developing country and ensuring that all confidentiality standards are reached. The pilot projects would be undertaken with the support of the World Bank Group and G20 countries, and would include partnerships with more experienced countries. The results of these pilot projects were expected to help redress the knowledge imbalance between tax administrations in developing countries and tax evaders.
Apart from criticisms relating to the lack of protection of the interests of developing countries, there have been some general criticisms relating to the actual drafting of the OECD's Standard. For example, it has been argued that the definitions of some of the terms are not very clear, such as that of Passive Non-Financial Entities (NFE) and Investment Entity.
156 Also, it has been argued that the cost of implementation and the ongoing cost of reporting under the Standard will be substantial, with the cost of reporting increasing as more jurisdictions sign up to it. It has been suggested that the burden could be reduced if reporting under the OECD's Standard could be more closely aligned with FATCA reporting, in terms of format and data requirements and of the dates the reports are due. In fact, this cost is proportionately greater for smaller financial institutions. Ibid, p.11 Taxpayer rights and taxpayer protection is also very problematic, not just under the OECD's Standard but also under any system of automatic exchange of information. A global automatic exchange of information system can only be successful to the extent that taxpayers' rights are protected in the same manner if the rights of the tax authorities to access the information are granted. It has been argued, that there is a need for an international standardized system that recognizes the right to defence of the taxpayers, the right to be notified that an exchange of information is taking place, the right to participate in the exchange of information, the right to confidentiality and the right to exercise legal actions and to apply to judicial bodies. 158 More specifically, in the IFA 2015 General Report, Baker & Pistone argued that a standard catalogue of rights applicable to taxpayers should include the following: -The right to privacy, including the protection of confidential information from disclosure -The right to a fair trial, including a fair investigation prior to trial and appeal rights, having independent and impartial tribunal established by law and a determination within a reasonable time -Freedom from discriminatory or arbitrary tax laws or procedures -Freedom from self-incrimination at least in so far as criminal penalties are concerned -Respect for the rule of law in tax legislation and tax procedures. 159 It has also been suggested that for taxpayers, transitional tax amnesties would provide a fair warning and an opportunity to come forward to settle their past tax liabilities on foreignsourced income in a relatively amicable manner before the enhanced international tax information sharing regime becomes effective. Similarly, for tax authorities, tax amnesties would serve as an effective way to transition to the new regime in a fast and efficient manner.
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Of course, there are no set rules and countries may confer rights under domestic law which go beyond the basic taxpayer rights outlined in OECD commentaries. For example, the Commentary to Article 26 of the OECD Model only deals with the issue of confidentiality and privacy and gives guidance on these issues only. 161 There is no discussion of other taxpayer rights. The focus in the OECD's Standard is similar. In the preliminary introductory section on the Standard, the OECD acknowledges that all treaties and exchange of information instruments contain strict provisions that require information exchanged to be kept confidential and limit the persons to whom the information can be disclosed and the purposes for which the information may be used. 162 It is emphasised that before entering into an agreement to exchange information automatically with another jurisdiction, it is essential 158 (OECD 1990 that the receiving jurisdiction has the legal framework and administrative capacity and processes in place to ensure the confidentiality of the information received and that such information is used only for the purposes specified in the instrument. 163 Reference is made to the OECD's Guide on Confidentiality, "Keeping it Safe" which sets out best practices relating to confidentiality and provides practical guidance on how to ensure an adequate level of protection. 164 Other than this vague mention of confidentiality, there is no other reference to taxpayers' rights.
OECD, Taxpayers' Rights and Obligations: A Survey of the Legal Situation in OECD Countries
As Baker and Pistone noted in their IFA 2015 General Report, the rapid and recent developments have outstripped the discussion of the protection needed. Especially in the context of automatic exchange of information on a large scale, it might be impractical to notify each taxpayer individually of the proposed exchange of information. It may be sufficient that taxpayers will be made aware by financial institutions that the information held by them is subject to the new systems of FATCA/OECD's Standard. 165 That does not mean that there is no scope for improvement of measures for taxpayer notification and involvement in the process.
For automatic exchange of information, the essential safeguards would seem to be those required for large quantities of personal data, the processing of those data and their transmission to other countries. There is little discussion so far on access to information by the taxpayer, time limits for which the recipient State may retain the data supplied, or controls on the use that may be made of the data. This is not just a question of taxpayers' protection but arguably, also a question of good tax administration or good governance and (administrative) best practices.
It is noteworthy that the European Union has had an active involvement in the development of the concept of good governance. At an ECOFIN meeting in 2008, one of the conclusions of the Council was to promote the principles of good governance in the tax area, described as 'the principles of transparency, exchange of information and fair tax competition, as subscribed to by Member States at Community level'. 166 Good governance in the tax area was identified as an essential means for combating cross-border tax fraud and evasion and for strengthening the fight against money laundering, corruption, and the financing of terrorism. 167 Interestingly, as mentioned in Part 3 (b) above, in the amended EU Mutual Assistance Directive, there is a requirement that the data subject be notified of the proposed exchange in sufficient time to exercise his data protection rights. 168 Arguably, this newly inserted provision is reflective of the general stance that the European Union is trying to take in promoting good governance in tax matters and good administrative practices. How this requirement will be executed in practice and what other protections and rights it might trigger, remains to be seen. 163 Ibid 164 Ibid 165 168 See Article 1(5)(b): requires that each reporting financial institution informs each individual reportable person that data will be collected and transferred, and does so in sufficient time for the reportable person to exercise his data protection rights.
Apart from the European Union, the OECD and the UN have similarly called for measures to improve governance through tax reform, as a catalyst for state capacity development. 169 Whilst the haste with which the international tax community is developing standards of automatic exchange of information is understandable, given the pretext of tackling tax avoidance and evasion, at the same time, some basic taxpayer rights ought to be established and protected with the same passion to ensure standards of good governance in tax administrations worldwide. Otherwise, too much state discretion may lead to abuse (intentional or unintentional) and in some cases, especially with developing countries, perpetuate arbitrary or corrupt practices.
(8) Singapore and Automatic Exchange of Information
Singapore became an independent republic following an ejection from Malaysia on 9 August 1965. In the 50 years since independence, Singapore has transformed itself from a "port hub in the Straits of Malacca to an international business and financial centre, as well as a cuttingedge manufacturing destination". 170 The manufacturing and service sectors are the twin engines of Singapore's economy. 171 Singapore has one of the most open economies in the world 172 and is highly integrated into the global economy. It also has one of the most business-friendly economies 173 with a competitive corporate tax rate of 17% and a partial exemption for the first SGD 300,000 of normal chargeable income, resulting in an effective tax rate of 8.36% for the first SGD 300,000. 174 Singapore is also considered an excellent holding company location for a multinational to manage its investments in Asia. In fact, almost half of the multinationals with Asia-Pacific operations have a substantial business presence in Singapore in the form of headquarters and many emerging Asian multinationals use Singapore as a platform for growth beyond the Asian markets. 175 Singapore and in general the Asia-Pacific have a fast growing market of high net worth individuals. In fact, Asia-Pacific is forecast to become the largest market of high net worth individuals in the world.
Historically, Singapore has adopted practically all OECD initiatives, though first taking a look, wait and see stance before full adoption. In this regard, the various reports/papers published and uploaded on the OECD's website would be a useful indicator of what Singapore is likely to follow.
As noted, there is a strong element of protection against any unauthorised disclosure of confidential taxpayer information by the Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore (IRAS). 177 In fact, it is a legal obligation for any official of IRAS having contact with taxpayer information to swear a declaration before a magistrate or comptroller to observe the law against unauthorised disclosure. "This formality not only has obvious legal force but also serves to instil the seriousness of the duty of preserving confidentiality in the official." 178 Since 2009, Singapore authorities have come under intense global pressure to strengthen their framework for international cooperation in the context of exchange of information. 179 In February 2009, the Singapore government made public its intentions to adopt the OECD's internationally agreed tax standard for exchange of information mentioned in Part 1. 180 In the April 2009 OECD progress report, 181 there were three lists of jurisdictions: the white list, 182 the grey list 183 and the black list. 184 Four jurisdictions were found to be on the black list 185 and numerous jurisdictions on the grey list. Singapore was placed on the grey list, as it had not fully implemented the internationally agreed standard.
Subsequently, Singapore endorsed the internationally agreed standard for exchange of information and began the process of renegotiating its tax treaties with treaty partners to implement the standard. By November 2009, Singapore had signed 14 protocols with some of its treaty partners to amend its tax treaties to incorporate the internationally agreed standard. The domestic tax laws were also amended to implement the new treaty obligations. Singapore moved to the OECD's white list on 13 November 2009. 186 In December 2009, the Singapore tax legislation was amended and the provisions came into force in February 2010. 187 In April 2013, the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes affirmed that Singapore's exchange of information regime was in line with the international standard. 188 It was noted that Singapore had efficient and effective information exchange communication channels which involved face-to-face meetings or telephone conferences to facilitate the process with principal exchange of information partner authorities such as Australia, India, Japan and New Zealand. 189 Eventually, more than half of Singapore's tax treaties conformed to the internationally agreed standard. Where a tax treaty incorporated the internationally agreed standard, Singapore would extend exchange of information assistance upon the request of the treaty partner. The new treaty obligations included, in addition, the removal of banking secrecy and lack of domestic tax interest as statutory barriers to the exchange of information on request. Furthermore, IRAS could obtain bank and trust information from financial institutions without having to seek a court order.
On 29 May 2013, Singapore also became a signatory to the Council of Europe/OECD Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, mentioned in Parts 1 and 4. 190 As a result, Singapore expanded its network of exchange of information partners by 13 jurisdictions, 191 including Brazil and the United States. In addition, the Ministry of Finance announced a decision to extend reciprocal exchange of information assistance to all tax treaty partners notwithstanding that some treaties had not been amended to incorporate the internationally agreed standard. In addition, on 1 July 2013, tax evasion and serious fraudulent tax evasion offences were designated as serious offences under Singapore tax legislation. 192 They are now predicate offences for money laundering under Singapore's main anti-money laundering legislation. 193 on 18 March 2015. On the same day, the IRAS issued the e-Tax Guide on Compliance Requirements of the Singapore-US Intergovernmental Agreement on Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act. This e-Tax Guide covered the main aspects of the due diligence and reporting requirements under the Agreement by explaining:  The financial institutions that must report;  The account holders and US reportable accounts;  Exempt financial institutions and excluded financial accounts;  The due diligence procedures required to be performed by Reporting SGFIs to identify the US reportable accounts;  The information to be reported; and  The timeline for such reporting.
With the IGA, SGFIs will benefit from simplified compliance procedures with regard to identifying and reporting on financial accounts held by US persons. SGFIs will also avoid the withholding tax on relevant payments that they receive from the US. According to the IGA, a Singapore-based financial institution (SGFI), for the purposes of FATCA, is a financial institution which is tax resident in or organised under the laws of Singapore, but excluding any branch of such financial institution that is located outside Singapore; or any branch of a financial institution not tax resident in or organised under the laws of Singapore, if such branch is located in Singapore. 2. Any information received under paragraph 1 by a Contracting State shall be treated as secret in the same manner as information obtained under the domestic laws of that State and shall be disclosed only to persons or authorities (including courts and administrative bodies) concerned with the assessment or collection of, the enforcement or prosecution in respect of, the determination of appeals in relation to the taxes referred to in paragraph 1, or the oversight of the above. Such persons or authorities shall use the information only for such purposes. They may disclose the information in public court proceedings or in judicial decisions. Notwithstanding the foregoing, information received by a Contracting State may be used for other purposes when such information may be used for such other purposes under the laws of both States and the competent authority of the supplying State authorises such use.
3. In no case shall the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 be construed so as to impose on a Contracting State the obligation: a) to carry out administrative measures at variance with the laws and administrative practice of that or of the other Contracting State; b) to supply information which is not obtainable under the laws or in the normal course of the administration of that or of the other Contracting State; c) to supply information which would disclose any trade, business, industrial, commercial or professional secret or trade process, or information the disclosure of which would be contrary to public policy (ordre public).
4. If information is requested by a Contracting State in accordance with this Article, the other Contracting State shall use its information gathering measures to obtain the requested information, even though that other State may not need such information for its own tax purposes. The obligation contained in the preceding sentence is subject to the limitations of paragraph 3 but in no case shall such limitations be construed to permit a Contracting State to decline to supply information solely because it has no domestic interest in such information.
5. In no case shall the provisions of paragraph 3 be construed to permit a Contracting State to decline to supply information solely because the information is held by a bank, other financial institution, nominee or person acting in an agency or a fiduciary capacity or because it relates to ownership interests in a person.
